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ABSTRACT 
This paper shows why State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) are sometimes preferred over 
the more known Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) in infrastructure governance con-
trary to the academic debate and policy focus the last two decades. The Danish case of 
transport infrastructure governance is examined focusing on the road and the rail net-
work where a new modern SOE model is developed and used in mega projects. This 
paper uses theories of historical institutional change focusing on path dependency and 
the gradual change mechanisms of layering and conversion to analyze the institutional-
ization of the SOE model and to argue how and why it excluded PPPs. The SOE model 
was chosen at a critical point in time when the PPP model was starting to grow in other 
countries. The SOE model combines a professional board and management with financ-
ing via state guaranteed-loans and user charges. The SOE model was layered on the 
existing agency model for public provision of transport infrastructure and became 
locked-in for new mega-projects. Combined with a general lack of institutional support 
for PPPs and a strong national economy the PPP model in Danish transport infrastruc-
ture governance was excluded. The paper contributes to the renewed academic interest 
in SOEs and the results are relevant to other countries coping with public-private mixes 
in infrastructure governance.  
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INTRODUCTION: WHY CHOOSE A STATE OWNED ENTERPRISE OVER A PUBLIC-
PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP? 
 
This paper focuses on why State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) are sometimes preferred 
over the more known Public-Private Partnership (PPP) model in building and financing 
new transport infrastructure. Infrastructure governance is a vital element in today’s eco-
nomic growth debate (OECD, 2015b). The European Union has recently launched an 
“Investment Plan for Europe” to boost the development of European infrastructure 
(European Commission, 2014). Transport Infrastructure is considered a main element in 
economic growth as it creates mobility in a society (Sclar, 2005) and transport infra-
structure is the largest sector for PPP projects in value terms in Europe in 2014 
(European Investment Bank, 2015) . The academic debate on infrastructure governance 
in the transport sector has been dominated by the Public-Private partnership (PPP) mod-
el for several decades (Hodge et al., 2010, Roumboutsos, 2016) and many transport in-
frastructure projects have also been characterized as mega projects (Flyvbjerg, 2014, 
Priemus and van der Wee, 2013). The state owned enterprises (SOE) model has been 
there all along, but there is little knowledge on how modern SOEs work (Grossi et al., 
2015, Florio and Fecher, 2011, Bruton et al., 2015), and how and why the SOE model 
has developed to secure its place in transport infrastructure governance. The paper con-
tributes to the growing literature on contemporary SOEs in public governance by ana-
lyzing SOEs in relation to the PPP model in the area of transport infrastructure govern-
ance. The research questions are: How do models for infrastructure governance change 
between SOEs and PPPs in the transport sector? Why has Danish transport infrastruc-
ture governance preferred the SOE model over the PPP model? 
We examine the case of Denmark where a modern SOE model is used for key transport 
infrastructure megaprojects in the roads and rail network. Denmark does not seem to 
have integrated the PPP model in infrastructure governance compared to other European 
countries (Hammerschmid and Ysa, 2010), but in some other areas than transport the 
PPP model has been used (Petersen, 2010) and it has been up for political discussion 
over time. Denmark is regarded as one of the most efficient economies which may point 
to why new private finance was not needed. The case of Danish transport infrastructure 
may shed light over why SOEs persisted while the PPP model stalled in infrastructure 
governance. To examine the research questions and analyze the Danish case, this paper 
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uses theories of institutional continuity and change in historical institutionalism  and 
focuses on gradual change via the processes of path-dependency (Pierson, 2004) layer-
ing, and conversion (Streeck and Thelen, 2005, Mahoney and Thelen, 2010, Conran and 
Thelen, 2016). The paper shows that a new ‘modern SOE’ model for megaprojects was 
chosen at a critical point in time where PPPs were starting to boom in other countries, 
but was not introduced in a Danish context. The modern SOE model was ‘layered’ on 
the existing public provision of transport infrastructure. This ‘modern SOE’ model with 
a professional board, state guaranteed-loans and user charges (“statsgarantimodellen”) 
became “locked-in” for transport infrastructure projects and increasing returns have 
appeared in using the modern SOE model. Combined with a strong national economy, 
this development has had consequences for new choices for both mega-projects and 
transport infrastructure provision in general in Denmark where PPPs have challenged 
the modern SOE-model, but never succeeded in becoming an alternative.  
POLICY INSTRUMENTS IN TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE 
GOVERNANCE: STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE 
PARTNERSHIP IN AN INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE PERSPECTIVE  
 
There are several policy instruments of infrastructure delivery that governments can 
choose among in the provision of infrastructure from government-ownership to the in-
clusion of market actors in governance practices (Salamon, 2002). Market-based gov-
ernance is the term used by Donahue and Nye (2002) for the inclusion and adoption of 
market mechanisms in governing public affairs. OECD (OECD, 2015b)has recently 
provided a useful overview and distinguishes between 1) Direct (public) provision, 2) 
Traditional public procurement, 3) State-owned enterprises (in full or in part), 4) Public-
private partnerships and concessions, 5) Privatization with regulation (OECD, 2015b, 
p.2). Infrastructure governance is here defined the following way: “By the governance 
of infrastructure is meant the processes, tools, and norms of interaction, decision-
making and monitoring used by governmental organizations and their counterparts with 
respect to making infrastructure services available to the public and the public sector. It 
thus relates to the interaction between government institutions internally, as well as their 
interaction with private sector, users and citizens. It covers the entire life cycle of the 
asset, but the most resource intensive activities will typically be the planning and deci-
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sion-making phase for most assets. More specifically it refers to the delivery modality 
and the public and private sectors (…)” (OECD, 2015b, p.2).  
Where the academic attention the last decades have been focusing on the market-based 
governance models in contracting-out (Kettl, 1993), privatization (Hodge, 2006) and 
PPPs (Hodge et al., 2010), OECD’s focus on more state-oriented policy instruments in 
infrastructure governance follows a newly academic recognition that the last decades of 
public management reform has not only led to more market-based governance, but in 
some countries more state control (Greve et al., 2016, Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011, Van 
de Walle et al., 2016) and thus a variety of public-private mixes (Wettenhall, 2010). In 
this line a renewed academic interest in SOEs has seen the light across disciplines as 
there is little knowledge on how modern SOEs work (Florio and Fecher, 2011, Bruton 
et al., 2015, Grossi et al., 2015) and empirically it turns out that SOEs are used to a 
large extent in infrastructure governance (OECD, 2014). Next to this PPPs as an infra-
structure model has had different national trajectories (Hammerschmid and Ysa, 2010) 
and has lost popularity in infrastructure projects on the backdrop of the financial crises 
where private finance dried out (Greve and Hodge, 2013) .This paper breaks new 
grounds by analyzing SOEs as a part of the reasons why PPPs as a model of infrastruc-
ture governance has not become influential in some countries and thus bridges the two 
distinct academic literatures on PPPs and SOEs respectively. As the OECD (2015b) 
overview shows there are more infrastructure models in play, but for the purpose of this 
paper, the focus is primarily on the SOE model and the PPP model, but in the presenta-
tion of the Danish case of road and rail network other models are also mentioned if rele-
vant.  
State-owned Enterprises (SOE) have through history been used by governments in 
situations with a lack of market or for strategic reasons (Farazmand, 2013, Wettenhall, 
1998). Milward (2011) adds concerns for social and political unification and national 
defence as reasons for why state ownership has been chosen historically. SOEs can be 
seen as a policy instrument to obtain both social and economic goals (Thynne, 1994) 
and it had its peak in Europe from the 1940’s till 1980’s especially in the network in-
dustries (Parker, 2003, Milward, 2011). There is a variety of forms of SOEs from purely 
state-owned with statutory status to mixed ownership forms and public limited compa-
nies and efforts have been made to create sound typologies (Wettenhall, 2003, Van 
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Thiel, 2012). The development, organization and reasoning for using SOE differ and 
often follow national trajectories (Greve et al., 1999, Van Thiel, 2012). In network in-
dustries, state ownership of infrastructure has been seen as the prominent governance 
model to secure a sufficient level of maintenance and equal access (Baldwin et al., 
2012). A report by OECD (2014) shows that half of all SOEs are in the network indus-
tries. However, state ownership has at the same time been criticized for a lack of effi-
ciency and on this background many SOE were privatized (Parker, 2003) or corpora-
tized especially in the Anglo-Saxon countries (Wettenhall, 2001) as a part of broader 
public management reforms (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011) where new policy instruments 
based on private sector or third part involvement were explored (Salamon, 2002).  
 
Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) became a policy instrument for governments in the 
early 1990s in earnest. PPPs are “long term contractual arrangements between a gov-
ernment and a private partner whereby the latter delivers and funds public services us-
ing a capital asset, sharing the associated risk” (OECD, 2012).Most reports date the be-
ginning of modern day PPP in infrastructure projects to the British government’s Pri-
vate Finance Initiative under John Major in 1992-1993. The British government wanted 
to encourage more infrastructure projects in order to modernize a run-down UK public 
sector. The government wanted to let private finance come to the fore to avoid having to 
use the public sector borrowing requirement.  The UK made an updated policy on PPPs 
(PF2) and a recent review of the UK experience of PPPs has been made by the OECD 
(2015a). A PPP is organized as a design-finance-build-own-operate-transfer (DFBOOT) 
or variants thereof (Duffield, 2010). The public sector and the private sector enter into 
long-term contracts, share risks and aim to achieve mutually acceptable objectives. 
Since the 1990’s, the policy for PPPs has spread to many areas of the world, including 
USA, the rest of Europe, Latin America and most recently to India and China (Hodge 
eds, 2010,OECD, 2008, OECD, 2011). PPPs have come to the forefront of the policy 
agenda in Europe after a decline in the aftermath of the global financial crises where 
private capital dried out. 82 PPP deals in infrastructure projects were signed in 2014 
(European Investment Bank, 2015). However, PPP as a policy instrument has had dif-
ferent trajectories in the EU (Hammerschmid and Ysa, 2010) and reservations remain 
among the member states.  
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When analyzing infrastructure governance as a choice between different policy instru-
ments there are broadly two strands of literature. A public economy account that ap-
proach the political choice of given policy instrument as the result of finding the opti-
mal and economically most viable model (Del Bo and Florio, 2012, De Bettignies and 
Ross, 2010) and an institutional approach choices are seen as a result of a historically 
and country dependent process (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). The institutionalist litera-
ture is centering on the question of institutional continuity and change. In a recent arti-
cle about how to distinguish different institutional approaches Koning (2015) encour-
ages scholars to distinguish between endogenous or exogenous change and to explore a 
sequential approach to its full potential. This paper follows this sequential approach and 
examines change mechanisms in an historical institutional perspective. The paper com-
bines two strands of historical institutional explanation namely a focus on path depend-
ency that emphasizes stability (Pierson, 2004) and gradual transformation that high-
lights change (Streeck and Thelen, 2005, Mahoney and Thelen, 2010).  
The focus on path dependency (Campbell, 2004, Pierson, 2004) look for critical junc-
tures and path dependencies. From the path dependency viewpoint, once a policy in-
strument emerges from a critical juncture when many options were open, further devel-
opments are “locked in” and set on a certain institutional pathway and create institution-
al stability. Pierson (2004) famously focused on four types of policy feedback types that 
lead to increasing returns. They are (1) large set-up costs, (2) learning effects, (3) coor-
dination effects, and (4) adaptive expectations. Actors get used to a certain institutional 
path once they acknowledge the initial costs in setting up a program which is the subse-
quently difficult to alter; they learn from practicing the institutionalized way of handling 
matters; they minimize costs because coordination departs from well-known principles; 
and most of the actors involved in the field will adapt their practice to the expected in-
stitutional structure. This is called the “lock-in” argument where vested interests and 
power is at play. There are interests who will have a stake in keeping the institutional 
arrangement going and will defend the model against other models. Several interests 
may protect that specific policy instrument and work against new policy instruments 
that challenge the existing order. 
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The path dependency approach has been supplemented by later contributions in on his-
torical institutionalism. While regarding path dependency as one way institutional 
change occur as abrupt change, most prominently Streeck and Thelen (2005) have fo-
cused on more gradual change mechanisms such as displacement, layering, drift, con-
version and exhaustion (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010, Streeck and Thelen, 2005). The 
perspective suggests that a path is not completely sealed off, but can be subject to grad-
ual change processes over time that is driven by  ongoing interpretations and meaning 
making processes of the formal institution by influential actors that potentially can lead 
to major change. The change mechanism layering is when new institutional elements 
are ‘layered’ on the existing institutions because the institution cannot be changed. Drift 
is when an institution keeps is formal integrity, but is ‘drifting’ away from the original 
intentions. Layering and drift are likely to occur when strong veto players are at stake as 
the old institution is not changed. Displacement is when institutions are tired out from 
inside by strategic actors that endogenously tries to replace old institutions with new 
ones. Conversion is when a formal institution is redirected towards new goals. Exhaus-
tion is when an institution is breaking down gradually due to time as a changer. When 
we examine the infrastructure development in the Danish road and rail network we thus 
study the different infrastructure governance models as policy instruments in an institu-
tional perspective. We both focus on critical junctures and the subsequent path where 
one of the policy instruments is chosen over others, but when analyzing the subsequent 
path we not only expect stability, but we pay attention to the different mechanisms of 
gradual change by studying how the policy instruments are institutionalized over time. 
A criticism sometimes raised against institutional theories is that they become engaged 
in too many historical details and “thick description” which do not make room for sin-
gle-factor explanations. This paper aims to get into the empirical variety of organiza-
tional forms so we stick with the more detailed approach which will is described in the 
following section. 
 METHODOLOGY 
This section focuses on how the empirical investigation of the Danish case has taken 
place. Guided by the theoretical framework and its insistence on documenting institu-
tional features of infrastructure governance and how they changes over time, we set out 
to map the institutional elements of the Danish transport sector focusing on megapro-
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jects where SOE-models have been used in order to provide an overview not found an-
ywhere else in the literature. This is the case with bridges and tunnels organized in Sund 
& Baelt A/S and the Copenhagen Metro I/S. The paper first describes the overall politi-
cal and administrative organization of the overall transport infrastructure area. Then we 
describe the models of infrastructure delivery understood as the main financial and or-
ganizational model that is used to provide infrastructure (OECD, 2015b) that are in play 
for roads and rail network respectively to understand the institutional context in which 
the SOE model develop. In the case of the Copenhagen metro both infrastructure and 
service provision will be described as they are to some extent integrated in the contracts. 
In the discussion section we then discuss and analyze, how and why the SOE-model for 
megaprojects and PPP are been institutionalized differently in a process of path depend-
ency and layering and conversion.  
To conduct this analysis we examined the websites under the Danish Ministry of 
Transport both for the historical and current overall organization of Danish Infrastruc-
ture and for how the transport projects are organized for roads and rail networks respec-
tively. Most of the relevant data was available on the internet. We supplemented this 
database with data from annual reports and formal strategies and government reports on 
the organizations in question. When possible we also used reports from the National 
Auditor Office to identify discussions and background on the selection of policy in-
struments both regarding choosing and the rejection of new policy instruments in an 
area. Based on this database we then analyzed the sequence in which the transport infra-
structure projects occurred in line with the suggestion from the institutional change lit-
erature by constructing both detailed organizational charts for overview and relations 
and time lines for each area to follow the potential process of institutional change. Next 
to this we followed the general debate on PPPs in Denmark the last 10 years and attend-
ed meetings, conferences, conducted interviews and other research activities that pro-
vided us with insights into key actors like the Ministry of Finance position on the ques-
tion of PPPs in general. 
In the following overview of the Danish case we show how the main infrastructure 
within road and rail network in Denmark is delivered via state agencies that contract out 
the construction work, but finance it over state appropriations. Next to this, a new SOE 
model with state guaranteed loans for mega projects became institutionalized early on 
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and “crowded out” the possibility for PPP model for in transport infrastructure govern-
ance. Combined with the fact that the Danish state had financial resources to withstand 
the need to choose the PPP model we show how elements of the PPP model has been 
tried and also adapted to some extent in the new SOE model, but always based on pub-
lic finance (through state guaranteed loans and user charges) and full control.  
  
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE INFRASTRUCTURE GOVERNANCE OF THE 
DANISH ROAD AND RAIL NETWORK 
 
The responsibility of the transport sector in Denmark is based in a national Ministry of 
Transport that is also responsible for the coordination with other levels of government. 
As a member of the EU, Denmark is obliged to implement EU-regulation and policies 
related to the transport sector.The Danish Ministry of Transport consists of a Depart-
ment, a number of executive agencies, independent councils and state-owned compa-
nies. The Department is responsible for the policy formulation, management of the min-
isterial area, strategic planning and the drafting of laws. The executive agencies are in 
charge of specific and technical issues of implementing and administering the transport 
legislation and policy, but also responsible to plan and deliver the infrastructure. The 
independent councils are dealing with accidents, complaints and monitor the competi-
tion situation. The SOE’s are independent organizational units owned fully or partial by 
the state, but managed and run by independent Board of Directors and Management 
Boards. Both the Danish regional and the local municipal level are also responsible for 
parts of the transport policy and infrastructure governance e.g. the municipalities are 
responsible for the main part of the road network, the regional transport organizations 
are tendering public passenger bus services and owns train infrastructure and service 
companies.  
The involvement of different public authorities is also the case in relation to the general 
policy development of SOEs and PPPs in Denmark. The overall responsibility of the 
SOEs is in the Ministry of Finance, but within the transport sector the ownership is 
placed in the Ministry of Transport. In relation to PPPs the policy has been spread out 
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on different ministries and has not resulted in a coherent policy and regulation frame-
work (Petersen, 2010). Today the Danish Ministry of Business and Growth with the 
Danish Consumer and Competition Authority in the forefront are responsible for advis-
ing public organizations on tender processes and PPP. However, the Ministry for Eco-
nomic Affairs and Interior, the Danish Ministry of Transport and the Danish Ministry of 
Finance are to some extent also working with PPP. As Petersen points out, the use of 
PPP in Denmark has been marginal also in relation to transport infrastructure (Petersen, 
2010), but since 2010 the PPP model has been introduced and tried out in other areas 
than the transport sector, notably in schools and for infrastructure facilities for new 
court houses.  In the following, the road and rail network will be described to show the 
dynamic of each area and how a modern SOE model for mega projects developed in 
each area.  
ROAD NETWORK 
 
The Danish road network is publically owned and is coordinated from the Danish Min-
istry of Transport with the Danish Road Directorate as responsible agency for the state 
owned roads that also holds a general sector responsibility for the road sector in Den-
mark. The road network is divided into the state road network which consists of motor-
ways and some highways which is around 5 % of the total network, but with a 45 % 
share of the total traffic work. The municipalities are responsible for the rest of the net-
work, where some of it is privately owned roads that are publically accessible. The 
Road Directorate and the municipalities are working on the planning, construction, 
maintenance and enlargement of the road-net. The road net is financed through state 
appropriations. Both the Road Directorate and the municipalities’ administrations are 
tendering all the construction and maintenance work of the roads to private companies. 
Thus the main infrastructure governance model for the road network is what OECD 
term direct (public) provision in terms of planning and finance with traditional public 
procurement in the construction and maintenance of the road net.  
Once, the Road Directorate did try to introduce the PPP model as well. In 2009, the 
Road Directorate did the first and only PPP-tender for a road construction project the 
so-called ‘Kliplev-Sønderborg’- motorway based on a Build-Operate-Transfer-model 
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(BOT). The Road Directorate took over a project from a county that was merged into a 
new region in Denmark. In 2010 the contract was signed with a Danish-Austrian con-
sortium KMG. The Danish state owns the road throughout the project, but the private 
part is responsible for the construction phase in all its aspects and the following mainte-
nance all in all a 30 year contract. The construction phase was finalized one and half 
year before schedule and the project is considered a success both by the Ministry and 
the municipality. Despite of the success, the Ministry has not used the PPP-model in 
other road construction cases either on state or municipality level. 
More prominent is the development and institutionalization of a new modern SOE mod-
el for mega projects of bridges and tunnels. Bridges and tunnels are normally under the 
regulation and organization of the road network, but some of the biggest infrastructure 
projects in Danish history are bridges and tunnels to secure better connection between 
the main islands and later to the neighboring countries Sweden and latest Germany and 
these have been governed through the SOE ‘Sund & Baelt Holding A/S’. Today, the 
company is responsible for the operation and maintenance of the two bridges the Great 
Belt Bridge and the Øresund Bridge and the construction of the future Fehmarn Belt 
Tunnel between Denmark and Germany.  
The development of this model began in 1987 when the Danish parliament decided to 
build the in total 18 km long highway and railway connection the Great Belt Bridge. In 
this period the Danish State faced budget constraints and it was decided in order to fi-
nance it, that the organizational and financial model should be a SOE that could take up 
state guaranteed loans on the international capital market and that the bridge should be 
paid by user-charges. The actual construction work was contracted out to entrepreneuri-
al companies and was carried out over a period of 10 years and the connection opened 
in 1997-98. The project was considered a success both by the population and the politi-
cians due partly to higher traffic volumes than forecasted and lower cost of interest rates 
than expected. The same model was used in the construction of the 16 km long Danish-
Swedish highway and railway connection the Øresund Bridge. A consortium equally 
owned by the Danish and Swedish state was made and it was financed through state 
guaranteed loans and paid by user-charges. The construction of the bridge was decided 
in 1991 by the Danish and Swedish governments and later the respective parliaments. 
The construction work was contracted out to engineer companies and it opened in 2000. 
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Again an unexpected high increase in the transport work and lower interest rates than 
expected has made the bridge a success. 
The successful cases have institutionalized a model in the area of tunnel and bridges on 
major projects based on the SOE ‘Sund & Baelt Holding A/S’. The model is called an 
SOE with a state guaranteed loan (“statsgaranti-modellen”) and also involves user 
charges and has been described in detail by Sund & Bælt (2014). The institutionaliza-
tion becomes clear in the current project of building the Fehmarn Belt Tunnel between 
Germany and Denmark where a PPP-model was discussed, but abandoned in favor of a 
the SOE on the Danish part of the connection. Hence, even though the bridges are fi-
nanced by user-charges, the PPP-model has not been used in the projects and the private 
sector involvement has been limited to contracting-out of the construction and mainte-
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 RAIL NETWORK 
The rail sector has been heavily reorganized since the 1990’s where the national Danish 
transport operator DSB was split up leading to the unbundling of passenger rail service 
and rail infrastructure. This development has been a part of liberalization process of the 
sector and has been further strengthened by EU-regulation(Christensen, 2015) . The 
Ministry of Transport is responsible for the general regulation and policy development 
of the sector. Rail Net Denmark is the responsible agency for the overall responsibility 
for planning, maintaining and modernization of the Danish railway and signal system 
infrastructure. The Department of Transport is also responsible for the partial ownership 
of ‘Metroselskabet’ which is responsible for the Copenhagen Metro. Next to the nation-
al rail network and the metro, there are regional based publically owned rail companies 
that maintain and operate so-called ‘local’ networks. The municipalities own the com-
panies either directly or through public regional transport companies.  
The rail network is all publicly owned and is financed mainly through state appropria-
tions. In 2003 the Rail Net Agency responsible for the rail net was turned into an SOE 
Rail Net Denmark with its own board of directors and management board and the pur-
pose was to make the organization into a ‘production company’. All agency-related 
tasks were moved to a new agency the Transport Authority that became the regulator in 
the rail sector. In 2006, the corporatization of the Rail Net Denmark was intensified 
with the political agreement of turning a part of the company into a public owned lim-
ited company Enterprise A/S with the purpose of a partly privatization of up till 25 % of 
the shares. In 2009, the corporatization of Enterprise A/S was set on hold due to finan-
cial problems in the company. The company stopped its commercial activities and was 
integrated back into the Rail Net Denmark. In the beginning of 2010, the corporatization 
of Rail Net Denmark was suddenly rolled back completely. The board of directors is 
discharged and the organization is turned into an agency and put under direct reference 
to the Minister. This event also leads to reorganization of sector where the coordinating 
role of the rail sector and the planning of rail projects are moved from the Transport 
Authority to the Rail Net Denmark once again.  
In 2009, an Infrastructure Fund with the value of 11, 9 billion Euros was founded with 
the purpose to coordinate all future infrastructure investments across modes of transport 
and the first program of investments had a clear focus on the rail network. This focus 
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was further strengthened in March 2013, when the present government unexpectedly 
decided to establish a Rail Fund with a value of 3,7 billion Euros on further rail infra-
structure investments. For PPP related matters, this was a missed opportunity in the 
sense that private finance opportunities were not explored, let alone chosen. Thus the 
main infrastructure governance model for the rail network is what OECD term direct 
(public) provision in terms of planning and finance with traditional public procurement 
in the construction and maintenance of the rail net. This model seems to be reinforced 
with the establishment of special rail infrastructure fund where mega projects like a new 
national signal program will be handled within the existing model of direct public pro-
vision with traditional procurement of the construction and maintenance. 
 
However, on the municipality level there has been a prominent example of the use of 
new modern SOE model for the mega project the establishment and operation of the 
Copenhagen Metro. On the municipal level, the metro in Copenhagen is organized in a 
SOE ‘Metroselskabet I/S’ (Metroselskabet) owned by the Danish State and the two mu-
nicipalities in the inner Copenhagen area1. The Company has the responsibility for the 
operation and the development of new metro lines, but the actual construction and oper-
ation are contracted out. The decision to make a metro or light rail was passed in par-
liament in 1992 and in 1996 after a tender process the company Copenhagen Metro 
Construction Group was awarded the construction of the network and the Italian 
transport company ‘Ansaldo STS’ (Ansaldo) was awarded the deliverance of the train 
fleet system. Ansaldo also won the contract to operate and maintain the metro and re-
won the contract in the second tender round. The actual operation and maintenance of 
the metro has in both cases been contracted out by Ansaldo to ‘Metro Service A/S’ 
(Metro Service)2. Hence, it was a contracting out model, but with PPP element because 
of the integration of delivering infrastructure in terms of the fleet and transport system 
combined operation and maintenance. This also goes for the Metro’s second phase 
Cityring that was passed by the parliament in 2007. Ansaldo won the contract to deliver 
                                                 
1 Ownership; 50% Copenhagen municipality, 41,7 % the Danish State by The Ministry of Transport and Frederiksberg municipality 
8,3 % 
2 Metro Service A/S was founded in 1998 and is owned by International Metro Service which is owned by ATM (Aziende Trans-
porti Milanese) and Ansaldo ATS 
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trains, system technology and infrastructure plus the first 5-8 years operation and 
maintenance of the metro line. The construction of the tunnels and stations was awarded 
to ‘Copenhagen Metro Team’. So though the metro is being financed and owned by the 
state and the municipalities, the construction of the infrastructure and the operation is 
handed over to a private partner that has been involved in the metro since the very be-
ginning. The Metro has been a success in terms of passenger satisfaction, reliability and 
passenger growth.  
 
DISCUSSION: MODEL FOR A MODERN SOE 
The Danish case shows that there are different models of infrastructure governance in 
use in the supply of road and rail network infrastructure. The main part of the transport 
infrastructure is provided via a public model as direct (public) provision where agencies 
or municipalities are responsible for the planning and delivery of infrastructure that is 
financed via state and municipality appropriations combined with traditional public pro-
curement where the construction and maintenance is contracted out to private engineer-
ing companies. This point to that the Danish government over the period studies has had 
the finance needed to build its infrastructure via direct public provision. However, from 
a governance point of view there are more reasons to engage with other new policy in-
struments than pure economic concerns namely to obtain efficiency and innovation 
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from private parties (Klijn, 2010) and in line with the general development in western 
European public management reforms (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011, Greve et al., 2016) 
other infrastructure models have been tried out in the Danish case.  
In line with the general policy development in Denmark in the 1990s where many old 
SOEs where sold off or reformed, the rail sector underwent major reforms including  
initial privatization (sale of assets) (Christensen, 2015). In relation to the rail network a 
corporatization of Rail Net Denmark was started combined with a privatization process 
of parts of Rail Net Denmark. However the privatization process was stopped and Rail 
Net Denmark was later turned back into agency form. This can be seen as an endoge-
nous institutional transformation where existing models of infrastructure governance are 
converted to new models of infrastructure governance. What is interesting is that the 
conversion of Rail Net Denmark is reverted back into an agency model. In 2009 and 
again in 2013, ear-marked public infrastructure funds were invented with the purpose of 
financing new mega projects in the rail network excluding the PPP model. As such 
PPPs have not been explored in the area of rail network where the direct public provi-
sion combined with traditional public procurement of the construction and maintenance 
work has been institutionalized.  
In the infrastructure governance of the Danish road network there is one example of a 
(moderated) PPP, but the model has not been developed further or used elsewhere, but 
there is an extensive use of a new modern SOE model that has proved to be resilient and 
continues to be a preferred model of infrastructure governance for new transport mega 
projects. This model was invented when the Danish economy was weaker and the new 
SOE is the responsible planner and provider of infrastructure where the mega projects 
are financed based on state guaranteed loans and user charges, and the construction 
work is mainly contracted out to private engineering companies. A version of this mod-
el is also found in the case of the mega project Copenhagen metro as a part of the rail 
network where the finance was based on state guaranteed loans and sale of land rights 
combined. To answer the research questions on how models of infrastructure govern-
ance change between SOEs and PPPs in the transport sector and why the SOE model is 
preferred over the PPP model in Danish transport infrastructure governance the follow-
ing sections will in a historical institutional perspective first discuss the institutionaliza-
tion of new modern SOE model for mega projects and second how this support the re-
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jection of PPPs in Danish transport infrastructure governance. The institutional change 
processes in Danish infrastructure transport governance for the road and rail network are 
shown in figure 3. 
 
INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE MODERN TRANSPORT SOE 
The first event that sparked off the interest in the new modern SOE model for mega-
projects was the decision by parliament in 1988 to build a new Great Belt Bridge in 
Denmark. This was the most visible megaproject in a long time, but also a project that 
had been on the cards for decades, but which no government had been able to get 
through with and public finance was scarce at that point. To establish this megaproject 
the government decided to establish a new independent SOE with mainly government 
board members and a management from the public sector. With this model it became 
possible to finance the project via government obtained loan using the Danish govern-
ment’s credit rating as security and the users were to pay off the loan via user charges. 
The bridge itself was to be constructed by contractors to the SOE. This model became 
known as the “statsgaranti-modellen”: an SOE with a professional board, state guaran-
teed loans and coupled with the introduction of user charges (Sund & Bælt, 2014). 
 
The second event and third event followed each other closely. In 1991, parliament in 
Denmark and parliament in Sweden voted for building a bridge across Øresund. They 
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used the same model that had been established with the Great Belt Bridge; an independ-
ent SOE with board at arms’ length from government and a professional management, 
state guaranteed loans and user charges. Later on the two project-based companies on 
the Danish side were organized in the umbrella SOE Sund & Bælt A/S that further insti-
tutionalized the layered element of mega-projects. Next to this, in 1992, the parliament 
decided on another mega-project in the shape of a Copenhagen metro (light rail) system. 
Here the organization was a joint venture between the Danish state and the Copenhagen 
municipality and Frederiksberg municipality. The company was established as an SOE 
(I/S) where both state and the municipalities had ownership. The actual construction of 
the metrosystem and the later daily management of the metro lines were contracted out 
to an Italian contractor. The finance model was built on sale of public owned real estate 
in an area of Copenhagen where available land was ripe for development. These events 
in 1991-1992 cemented the SOE with state guaranteed loans-model for transport infra-
structure megaprojects in Denmark. The new SOE model became the preferred one 
within a short (5 years) span of time. They employed the same features: An SOE model 
with a professional board and management, and a financing model resting on a state 
guaranteed loan, introduction of user charges and for the Metro sale of land rights.  
 
The fourth event was when the Metro was going to have an extension –project, the so-
called Metro Ring. This megaproject was being shaped in the way of the already exist-
ing Metro-project. After a bidding round, the same contractors were even chosen to per-
form the task of building the actual infrastructure and running the Metrorail service.  
 
The fifth event was when the discussion on the Fehmarn Belt megaproject began to 
emerge. The Fehmarn Belt connection will connect Denmark and Germany through a 
tunnel and/or a bridge. There was consideration of a PPP solution, but after initial calcu-
lations by a consultant company, the idea was abandoned, and the preferred model has 
been the SOE model with the Danish government (for the Danish side of the project) 
obtaining a state guaranteed loan and making users pay through user charges over a 30+ 
year period. Once again, the new modern SOE model prevailed in transport infrastruc-
ture governance with the same kind of organizational and financial model. 
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Seen from an analytical perspective of institutional change theory the new modern SOE 
model for mega-projects was institutionalized upon the existing agency model for infra-
structure governance as a new institutional layer. The new layer consists of new project-
oriented organizational forms, introduction of user-charges and state-guaranteed loans 
on the commercial market. It never threatens the old agency model, but we will argue 
that this layered SOE model became “locked-in” after it was first used for the Great Belt 
Bridge and create a form of path-dependency that excludes new layers e.g. PPP as a 
model in infrastructure governance. The path dependency takes place through Pierson 
(2004)’ feedback types. As a mega project there were large set-up costs that had to be 
paid back from the model itself over a long period of time. Next to that there were learn-
ing effects as the SOE model was progressively being adjusted and eventually the two 
companies building the bridges were connected in one company (Sund & Bælt) which 
led to coordination effects as Ministry of Transport could govern and negotiate with the 
same board and management of the SOE across more mega projects. This made the new 
SOE model flexible and easily manageable for the government. In this line Sund & Bælt 
(n.a.) argues that fewer transaction costs are used in the SOE model than in the PPP 
model with complex contracts and risk management schemes. When there have been 
controversies – for example with noise complaints in the Metro system leading to an 
extension of the completion date, or the exact pricing of the user charge – the govern-
ment has been able to negotiate with the SOE to find a solution. There is however no 
knowing of the counterfactual claim that the presence of private finance would have 
gotten the actors to act in a different way, and maybe find savings in the budget rather 
than just postponing completion. What we argue is that the institutionalization of this 
new layered SOE model for mega projects in transport infrastructure governance creates 
an institutional path dependency in transport infrastructure governance in general that 
excludes PPPs as a model in new transport mega projects even in moderated forms. This 
will be elaborated on in the next section. 
 THE REJECTION OF PPP AS NEW SEPARATE MODEL OF TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE 
GOVERNANCE  
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In 2009 the Danish Road Directorate tried a version of PPP with a BOT model when 
they decide to build a new piece of motorway between Kliplev-Sønderborg. The Road 
Directorate did not come up with the idea for a PPP, but took over a project from a 
county. Despite the success in terms of finishing before time and on budget, the model 
is not further replicated. The county who originally had enthused about a PPP was not 
in existence anymore, and the Road Directorate did not feel a need to pursue a policy 
towards PPPs. As it could have been an attempt of layering where a new model is lay-
ered upon the existing, it does not lead to any major change in the public provision of 
transport infrastructure in Denmark that stays public organized and financed. 
Next to that private sector actors came to realize that when the Metro project was decid-
ed and later the Fehmarn Belt (although that has taken a lot longer to agree on), that 
private actors has to  adapt to the SOE model with state guaranteed loans and user 
charges, because this was the preferred model for the Danish government. Suddenly 
shifting to a private finance model, and giving up the interests from the state was not 
going to be viable. Key stakeholders in government and in SOEs all had a vested inter-
est in keeping the SOE model going, and private finance injections into the finance 
model would alter that situation. Therefore, private finance was not used in the transport 
megaprojects in Denmark. The SOE model with state guaranteed loans and user charges 
therefore do not seem to be challenged easily. Later, the robust Danish economy has 
made it unnecessary for the Danish state to experiment with PPP. When other countries 
began to experience with the PPP model in the 1990’s and 2000’s, the Danish transport 
mega-projects were already “locked-in” to the SOE model with state guaranteed loans 
and user charges. 
The lack of support for PPPs in transport infrastructure governance follows the general 
picture about PPPs across various Danish governments during the last two decades. 
Where the UK and other countries have PPP units staffed with professional expertise 
(OECD, 2011), Denmark has not had a comparable, specialized PPP unit in the power-
ful Ministry of Finance. Instead PPP guidance has been offered by a small office in the 
Competition and Consumer Authority which is an agency within the Ministry of Busi-
ness and Growth. PPPs have been on the agenda in the Danish Productivity 
Commission (2013), but the commission’s recommendations and other reports have 
been ignored. The Ministry of Transport does not seem to prioritize knowledge on 
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PPPs. In 2014, the Danish government published a report on infrastructure investments 
(Danish Government, 2014) was published, but Denmark is still a long way from other 
countries more elaborate policy planning for infrastructure. 
CONCLUSIONS:  SOE AS A SUBSTITUTE TO PPP IN TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE 
GOVERNANCE  
Based on the puzzle why SOEs prevail after decades of policy focus on PPPs in 
transport infrastructure governance this paper has analyzed and explained the develop-
ment of a modern SOE model in transport infrastructure governance in Denmark. Using 
theories of historical institutional change, the analysis shows a number of models for 
infrastructure governance in Danish road and rail network and that a new modern SOE 
model was layered on top of the predominant agency model when the first transport 
mega-project was decided in a the late 1980s where public finance were scarce. Subse-
quent decisions on further transport mega-projects in quick succession therefore used 
the modern SOE model as inspiration. The modern SOE model consisted of an inde-
pendent SOE with professional board and management and a finance model consisting 
of state guaranteed loans and user charges for bridges and tunnels and exploitation of 
land use in the case of the Metro. The paper points to a sequence of five events that has 
institutionalized the new modern SOE as a layered model for mega projects in transport 
infrastructure governance, which, it is argued, created a path dependency via policy 
feedbacks that excluded PPP as a viable model in transport infrastructure governance in 
Denmark. Next to that there has in general been a lack of institutional support in Den-
mark when it comes to PPPs that together with Denmark’s economic status as an AAA-
economy made private finance through the PPP model less relevant.   
The paper contributes in three ways to current debate in public policy and management. 
First, it contributes with an empirical overview of the various models for transport in-
frastructure governance in Denmark within road and rail network and how they institu-
tionally evolve and relate that show the relevance of analyzing public-private mixes 
(Wettenhall, 2010) when understanding infrastructure governance today. Second, espe-
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cially in relation to the PPP literature it reveals how the PPP model can be rejected in a 
modernized public sector as the Danish one  where alternative new models closer to 
traditional public infrastructure delivery can exclude PPPs. Based on this the paper 
thirdly makes an important contribution to the call to understand contemporary SOEs 
(Bruton et al., 2015, Grossi et al., 2015, Florio, 2014a) by supplementing current expla-
nations that SOE prevail because of mixed-ownership as hybrid organizations (Bruton 
et al., 2015) or because of financial performance, emergency role for the state, privatiza-
tion reversal or international expansion (Florio, 2014b). The paper shows the develop-
ment and use of a new 100% SOE is perceived to outperform marketized solutions. The 
paper’s conclusions are relevant in other countries where public models prevail over 
market-based infrastructure governance and point to the importance of focusing on 
SOEs and other public models in infrastructure governance and thus on policy level to 
update and rethink the policy for SOE-models in future infrastructure policies.  
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